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Abstract
Objectives: The emergence of human-unique cognitive abilities has been linked to
our species' extended juvenile period. Comparisons of cognitive development across
species can provide new insights into the evolutionary mechanisms shaping cogni-
tion. This study examined the development of different components of spatial mem-
ory, cognitive mechanisms that support complex foraging, by comparing two species
with similar life history that vary in wild ecology: bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chim-
panzees (Pan troglodytes).
Materials and methods: Spatial memory development was assessed using a cross-
sectional experimental design comparing apes ranging from infancy to adulthood.
Study 1 tested 73 sanctuary-living apes on a task examining recall of a single location
after a 1-week delay, compared to an earlier session. Study 2 tested their ability to
recall multiple locations within a complex environment. Study 3 examined a subset of
individuals from Study 2 on a motivational control task.
Results: In Study 1, younger bonobos and chimpanzees of all ages exhibited improved
performance in the test session compared to their initial learning experience. Older
bonobos, in contrast, did not exhibit a memory boost in performance after the delay. In
Study 2, older chimpanzees exhibited an improved ability to recall multiple locations,
whereas bonobos did not exhibit any age-related differences. In Study 3, both species
were similarly motivated to search for food in the absence of memory demands.
Discussion: These results indicate that closely related species with similar life history
characteristics can exhibit divergent patterns of cognitive development, and suggests
a role of socioecological niche in shaping patterns of cognition in Pan.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Complex cognition is one of the defining traits of the human species, so
understanding the origins of the human mind is a pressing issue for
human evolution. Why do we possess such complex cognitive abilities,
and how are these skills acquired? The flexible behavior that humans
exhibit has motivated numerous theories concerning the human mind,
examining both ultimate questions about the evolutionary history of
human cognition, as well as proximate questions about the mechanisms
underpinning behavior (Hare, 2017; Hill, Barton, & Hurtado, 2009;
Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000; MacLean, 2016; Tomasello,
2014; Whiten & Erdal, 2012). An emerging approach to answering these
issues is to probe the evolutionary and developmental roots of human
cognition in an integrative fashion, by examining patterns of comparative
cognitive development across species (Bjorklund & Green, 1992; Gomez,
2005; Matsuzawa, 2007; Matsuzawa, Tomonaga, & Tanaka, 2006;
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Rosati, Wobber, Hughes, & Santos, 2014). The current work compared
patterns of cognitive development in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and
bonobos (Pan paniscus), our two closest-living relatives, to illuminate
the evolutionary origins of complex cognitive skills across species,
including in humans.
Several proposals specifically link human cognitive capacities to our
species' specialized life history characteristics. Humans are marked by
an extended juvenile period as well as increased total longevity (Bogin,
2010; Bogin & Smith, 1996; Leigh, 2004; Leigh, 2012; Robson & Wood,
2008; Schwartz, 2012). According to the life history hypothesis, humans'
prolonged juvenile period enables greater behavioral flexibility and
extended periods of complex skill acquisition over development, and
our increased longevity allows for these skills to be exploited such that
they “pay off” over the lifespan (Bjorklund & Bering, 2003; Bjorklund &
Green, 1992; Janson & van Schaik, 1993; Kaplan et al., 2000; Schuppli,
Isler, & van Schaik, 2012). This view suggests that life history character-
istics drive shifts in cognitive development, such that a longer juvenile
period can allow for longer periods of cognitive development and skill
refinement. This proposal is supported by evidence from human forager
populations indicating that individuals may not exhibit adult-like hunt-
ing or foraging skills until adulthood (Gurven, Kaplan, & Gutierrez,
2006; Kaplan et al., 2000; Koster et al., 2019). Taking a broader com-
parative perspective, primates also exhibit a relatively extended juvenile
period, which has been proposed to stem from the long time needed to
acquire skills to exploit complex diets (Ross & Jones, 1999; although
note that young chimpanzees already exhibit adult-like dietary breadth;
Bray, Emery Thompson, Muller, Wrangham, & Machanda, 2018). Other
evidence comes from comparisons showing that larger brain size and
slower life histories tend to covary across species (Anton, Potts, &
Aiello, 2014; Isler & van Schaik, 2014; Schuppli, Grabre, Isler, & van
Schaik, 2016; Schwartz, 2012). However, this line of work primarily
uses brain size as a proxy for cognitive skills. Brain size is only a rough
index of more specific cognitive abilities (Healy & Rowe, 2007; Logan
et al., 2018), and there is clear evidence that closely related species
may have similar overall brain size but nonetheless exhibit major differ-
ences in cognition and behavior (Hare, Wobber, & Wrangam, 2012;
Maclean et al., 2014; Rilling et al., 2011; Rosati, 2017a). Conse-
quently, comparisons of cognitive development across species are
crucial to test whether life history characteristics shape cognitive
development.
A second perspective on the relationship between cognitive evolu-
tion and development focuses on how differences in ontogenetic trajec-
tories shape an organism's phenotype in relation to their adaptive niche.
In this view, shifts in the timing of development, or heterochrony, are an
evolutionary mechanism for producing new adaptive traits across species
(Gould, 1977; Moczek et al., 2015). A classic example of this “evo-devo”
approach concerns variation in beak morphology in Galapagos finch spe-
cies. This radiation of finches exhibit major differences in the length and
breadth of their beaks, thereby allowing different species to occupy dif-
ferent dietary niches (Grant, 1986). Mechanistically, these differences in
beak structure arise from developmental variation in the expression of
genes affecting beak growth (Abzhanov et al., 2006; Abzhanov, Protas,
Grant, Grant, & Tabin, 2004; Grant, Grant, & Abzhanov, 2006). This line
of work shows how small tweaks in the timing of developmental
processes produce phenotypic variation that can impact a species'
ecological niche. Extending this view to cognitive traits, closely
related species that differ in socioecological characteristics may
differ in the pace and patterns of cognitive development (Rosati,
Wobber, et al., 2014; Wobber, Wrangham, & Hare, 2010a). This
socioecology hypothesis predicts that patterns of cognitive develop-
ment will covary with socioecological characteristics across species.
To date, evidence in support of this view comes primarily from
studies of social cognition. For example, gaze following (or co-orienting
with others) allows individuals to apprehend important information that
others detect in their environment. While many primates exhibit gaze-
following responses similar to humans as adults, comparative develop-
mental studies have revealed that some species may acquire this skill
over slower timescales (Ferrari, Coude, Gallese, & Fogassi, 2008;
Ferrari, Kohler, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2000; Rosati, Arre, Platt, & Santos,
2016; Rosati & Santos, 2017; Tomasello, Hare, & Fogleman, 2001;
Wobber, Herrmann, Hare, Wrangham, & Tomasello, 2014), suggesting
different developmental pathways that require more social experience
in species with different social organizations than humans (Ferrari et al.,
2000; Ferrari et al., 2008). However, it is unclear whether these find-
ings concerning the development of social cognition can be extended
to other cognitive abilities more broadly.
The current work provides a new test of the life history and
socioecology hypotheses by comparing patterns of spatial memory
development in chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) and bonobos (P. paniscus).
Chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest-living relatives (Prüfer et al.,
2012), and are an important model for the mind and behavior of the
last common ancestor of humans and other apes (e.g., McGrew, 2010;
Muller, Wrangham, & Pilbeam, 2017; Stanford, 2012; Wrangham &
Pilbeam, 2001). These species also provide a targeted test of the life
history and socioecological hypotheses, because they show different
socioecological niches but share similar life history traits. Impor-
tantly, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: increased intelli-
gence might emerge from changes in socioecology, life history, or
both in tandem. For example, humans are marked by a suite of
potentially linked characteristics including extreme intelligence, long
life history, and complex diets (Kaplan et al., 2000; Robson & Wood,
2008; Schuppli et al., 2012). Broad comparative analyses similarly
suggest strong covariation across primates between life history and
dietary complexity (indexed by frugivory vs. folivory; Leigh, 1994), as
well between brain size, life history, and dietary complexity (indexed
by food processing behaviors or wide dietary breadth; Schuppli
et al., 2016). The current work can help disentangle these pathways
for generating complex cognition because the life history and socio-
logical characteristics of these species provide distinct predictions
for patterns of cognitive development in Pan.
In terms of life history, apes exhibit relatively slow life histories,
with long juvenile periods and extended postnatal brain and cognitive
development more like humans (Bianchi et al., 2013; Leigh, 2004;
Leigh, 2012; Matsuzawa, 2007; Matsuzawa et al., 2006; Sakai et al.,
2011; Teffler et al., 2013). For example, chimpanzees exhibit slower
rates of white matter maturation (Sakai et al., 2011) and longer
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periods of synaptogenesis in childhood (Bianchi et al., 2013) compared
to Old World monkeys. While there are not comparable studies of
bonobo brain development, studies of physical maturation indicate
that chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit largely similar life history mile-
stones, such as age of weaning, sexual maturity, or first birth (Robson &
Wood, 2008; Walker, Walker, Goodall, & Pusey, 2018). Thus, the life
history hypothesis predicts that chimpanzees and bonobos will both
exhibit similar patterns of cognitive development, given their similar life
history patterns.
In terms of socioecology, however, these species exhibit key differ-
ences. Chimpanzees exhibit stronger male bonds and more escalated
aggression, whereas bonobos exhibit stronger bonds between females
and increased socio-sexual behaviors (Gruber & Clay, 2016; Hare et al.,
2012; Parish, 1996; Surbeck & Hohmann, 2008; Wrangham & Pilbeam,
2001). An influential proposal specifically links these differences in
social behavior to core differences in their feeding ecology. Chim-
panzees are more dependent on patchy, seasonably variable fruit
resources, exhibit larger day ranges, and engage in effortful and time-
consuming food processing or hunting techniques; bonobos, in con-
trast, have more access to homogenously distributed terrestrial herbs,
rarely hunt, and have not been observed to use tool in the wild
(Furuichi et al., 2015; Hare et al., 2012; Kano, 1992; Malenky &
Wrangham, 1993; Rosati, 2017a; Stanford, 1998; Surbeck & Hohmann,
2008; White, 1989; White, 1998; White & Wrangham, 1988;
Wrangham, 2000; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). These wild observa-
tions suggest that chimpanzees typically face more “difficult” foraging
problems than bonobos, and several of these differences specifically
reflect the fact that chimpanzees exploit foods with more variable dis-
tributions across time and space, and forage over larger areas, than do
bonobos. Accordingly, the socioecology hypothesis predicts that chim-
panzees need and bonobos will exhibit targeted differences in the
development of cognitive skills that are relevant to these foraging prob-
lems, such as spatial memory.
Spatial memory is a good target for comparative developmental
studies for several reasons. First, spatial memory is an important cogni-
tive substrate for foraging behaviors, as wild primates generally face
complex spatial problems revolving around locating resources and trav-
eling efficiently through their environment (Gallistel, 1990; Janmaat,
Ban, & Boesch, 2013; Janson, 1998; Janson, 2007; Janson & Byrne,
2007; Normand, Ban, & Boesch, 2009; Normand & Boesch, 2009;
Shettleworth, 1998). Spatial memory likely plays a crucial role in human
forager's daily ranging and central-place foraging patterns (Marlowe,
2005), which pose more complex spatial problems than faced by apes,
who feed on-the-go within smaller areas. The ability to track and navi-
gate between high value, patchy resources are therefore crucial compo-
nents of the human foraging niche. Spatial memory also develops on a
fairly well-characterized pathway in humans that provide clear bench-
marks for comparative work, as children show shifts in abilities to encode
locations through late childhood (Balcomb, Newcombe, & Ferrara, 2011;
Haun, Rapold, Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006; Hermer & Spelke, 1994;
Hermer-Vazquez, Moffet, & Munkholm, 2001; Levinson, Kita,
Haun, & Rasch, 2002; Newcombe, Huttenlocher, Drummey, & Wiley,
2006; Ribordy, Jabes, Banta Lavenex, & Lavenex, 2013; Sluzenski,
Newcombe, & Satlow, 2004). For example, the emergence of
language-based encoding of spatial locations allows humans to solve
spatial problems within creasing flexibility and accuracy compare to
other species (e.g., Hermer-Vazquez et al., 2001; Hermer-Vazquez,
Spelke, & Katnelson, 1999). Thus, human spatial memory exhibits
the extended developmental trajectory as well as the potentially
species-unique features that are central to the life history hypothe-
sis. Finally, studies of spatial memory comprise some of the stron-
gest evidence that socioecology can shape cognition across species
(Pravosudov & Roth, 2013; Rosati, 2017b; Sherry, 2006), with links
between socioecology and spatial cognition documented in birds
(Healy, de Kort, & Clayton, 2005; Pravosudov & Roth, 2013; Sherry,
2006), voles (Gaulin & Fitzgerald, 1989; Jacobs, Gaulin, Sherry, &
Hoffman, 1990), and primates (Platt, Brannon, Briese, & French,
1996; Rosati, Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014).
What is currently known about the development of spatial mem-
ory in chimpanzees and bonobos? There is clear evidence that apes
exhibit several sophisticated abilities for dealing with spatial problems.
For example, chimpanzees and bonobos use cognitive spatial maps to
follow an optional search path when locating targets in large spaces
(Menzel, 1973; Menzel, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Menzel, 2002), and
these kinds of memories may persist over very long time-scales
(Martin-Ordas, Berntsen, & Call, 2013; Mendes, 2008). Apes can also
solve some spatial problems using complex “episodic-like” memory
skills (Martin-Ordas, Haun, Colmenares, & Call, 2010) that integrate
information about events with their spatial and temporal contexts.
However, current comparative data on spatial cognitive development
in apes is limited in several regards. First, most work on spatial mem-
ory in these species has used mixed-age samples without examining
developmental trajectories, likely due to sample size limitations
(Albiach-Serrano, Call, & Barth, 2010; Haun, Call, Janzen, & Levinson,
2006; Haun, Rapold, et al., 2006; Hribar & Call, 2011; Hribar, Haun, &
Call, 2011; Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). There are generally few studies
of cognitive development in apes, and most to date have typically
traced the development of just a few individuals of one species (three
or fewer; Bering, Bjorklund, & Ragan, 2000; Bjorklund, Bering, &
Ragan, 2000; Matsuzawa, 2007; Matsuzawa et al., 2006; Rosati,
2015; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005).
In terms of comparative development, some work with larger sam-
ples indicates that chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit broad similarities
in their cognitive abilities across several distinct domains of cognition,
including basic object knowledge, numerical knowledge, and social cog-
nition (Herrmann, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2010; Wobber et al., 2014).
But there also appears to be some relevant differences in their patterns
of cognitive development. For example, chimpanzees exhibit faster
development of social inhibitory control than bonobos (Wobber,
Wrangham, & Hare, 2010b), and chimpanzees also exhibit improve-
ments in their memory for multiple locations as they transition out of
infancy, whereas bonobos do not (Rosati & Hare, 2012). These findings
parallel research contrasting other aspects of development in chimpan-
zees and bonobos. For example, bonobos exhibit developmental delays
in their dental and cranial morphology relative to chimpanzees,
retaining more juvenile features in the size-shape relationships of the
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head (Lieberman, Carlo, de Leon, & Zollikofer, 2007; Shea, 1983a; Shea,
1983b; Shea, 1984). Bonobos exhibit more juvenile-like levels of thy-
roid hormone and testosterone at later ages than do chimpanzees
(Behringer, Deschner, Murtaugh, Stevens, & Hohmann, 2014; Wobber,
Hare, Lipson, Wrangham, & Ellison, 2013). In terms of behavioral devel-
opment, bonobos continue to exhibit more juvenile-like patterns of
social behaviors and tolerance as they age (Furuichi & Ihobe, 1994;
Hohmann & Fruth, 1993; Kuroda, 1989; Palagi, 2006; Wobber et al.,
2010b). Overall, these findings suggest that bonobos may exhibit pae-
domorphism, or developmental delays in acquisition of traits resulting
in a juvenilized or underdeveloped set of adult traits (Hare et al., 2012).
The current work addresses whether chimpanzees and bonobos
show similar divergences in the ontogeny of spatial cognition. The
first study examined apes' memory for a single location after a long
delay. Different cognitive and neurobiological processes support
short-term memory on the scale of seconds, versus long-term memory
over minutes, days, or longer periods (Baddeley, 2010; Mankin et al.,
2012; Nielson, Smith, Sreekumar, Dennis, & Sederberg, 2015; Norris,
2017). Children's memory for locations over even minutes-long delays
exhibits major developmental improvements beginning in toddler-
hood: 18-month-olds made almost twice as many errors searching for
an object they had seen hidden 2 min before than did 42-month-olds
(Sluzenski et al., 2004). Memory retained over more extended periods
is likely to be especially crucial for foraging behaviors, as animals in
the wild must locate resources that are widely dispersed in time and
space (Janson & Byrne, 2007). In Study 1, apes were therefore tested
for their ability to recall a baited location after a 1-week delay. In an
initial session, apes learned that one of two possible locations was
consistently baited with hidden food; their recall of that location was
assessed in a test session 1 week later. As trial-and-error learning
could occur within both sessions, contrasting performance in the test
session with performance in the initial learning session can isolate the
memory benefit of the earlier experience on recall or re-learning. This
basic procedure has previously been used to compare spatial memory
across several species of lemurs and found that a highly frugivorous
lemur species was the most accurate on their first test trial, and
exhibited more relative improvement during the test session, even
though a more folivorous species actually exhibited faster initial learn-
ing (Rosati, Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014). This basic setup has also been
validated for apes as a measure of recall for a specific place in space
(also referred to as a “cognitive map” of space; Tolman, 1948), rather
than a habitual motor memory that depends on representations of
the organisms' egocentric movements centered on their own body
(e.g., “turn left to find food”; Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996;
Packard, 1996; Packard, 2009; Poldrack & Packard, 2003). Apes had
relatively few trials of experience (as habit-based memory strengthens
over extended experience), and prior work shows that apes exhibit a
spatial strategy in this context (Rosati, 2015; Rosati unpublished data).
Thus, performance in this situation reflects memory for particular spa-
tial locations in apes.
The second study then examined apes' abilities to recall multiple
locations in larger, a more naturalistic environment. The ability to navi-
gate through multiple locations in the environment necessarily requires
memories for places (Maguire et al., 1998; Morris, Garrud, Rawlins, &
O'Keefe, 1982; Sluzenski et al., 2004), and prior experimental work in
large spaces indicate that chimpanzees and bonobos use cognitive
maps of space to optimally navigate between different locations
(Menzel, 1973; Menzel et al., 2002). Importantly, children's memory for
multiple locations in larger spaces also exhibits developmental improve-
ments beginning in toddlerhood, as older children show more spatially
specific searches and can recall more locations as they move to search
for hidden targets (Balcomb et al., 2011;Newcombe & Huttenlocher,
1998 ; Sluzenski et al., 2004). In Study 2, apes initially watched an
experimenter hide four pieces of food in a large outdoor enclosure
filled with a variety of landmarks such as trees, bushes, rocks, and posts.
An additional four control pieces had been previously hidden at a set of
matched locations while the ape could not observe. Wild animals can
use a variety of additional types of information such as visual cues,
olfaction, or even social learning to locate food (Janson & Byrne, 2007),
so this experiment contrasted abilities to locate test pieces (that apes
observed being hidden) and control pieces (which they did not) to spe-
cifically assess spatial memory, in the absence of these other sources of
information. After a 10-min delay, apes could enter the enclosure to
search for food. Each ape completed one test session, in order to exam-
ine their spontaneous ability to recall the location of the hidden food,
following the basic procedure used previously with apes (Rosati & Hare,
2012) and lemurs (Rosati, Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014). Importantly, the
number of hiding locations, delay to search, and size of the space in this
study exceeds prior work examining memory in human children
(Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1998; Sluzenski et al., 2004), so recalling
these locations is likely quite challenging for young apes.
The final study then retested a subset of individuals from Study
2 on control task that equated basic motivational demands but did not
require spatial memory. One possibility is that apes' performance in
Study 2 could stem from differences (across species or ages) in motiva-
tion to travel through the larger space and search for food. This final
study explicitly tested this by assessing how successful apes were at
navigating the enclosure to pick up food that was placed on the ground,
rather than hidden under grass. Prior work suggests that motivation
does not account for differences between chimpanzee and bonobo
memory, as both species are fairly successful when the memory-
specific demands are reduced (e.g., because fewer test pieces are hid-
den and the delay to search is shortened; Rosati & Hare, 2012). Study
3 provides a stronger test of a motivational interpretation, as there is
no need to recall specific locations at all to succeed. Importantly, given
the large distances and complex natural context, food placed in distal
locations in the enclosure was not salient from the apes' initial observa-
tion point. Thus, apes did need to be motivated to traverse the space
of the enclosure and to find the food, as in Study 2.
To assess developmental trajectories for spatial memory in chim-
panzees and bonobos, this work utilized cross-sectional experimental
tests of cognition in apes ranging from infancy to young adulthood.
There are two primary methodological approaches to assessing devel-
opmental changes in psychology: longitudinal (within-subject) designs
that examine developmental sequences within a given individual, or
cross-sectional (“snapshot”) designs comparing individuals of different
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ages (Baltes, Reese, & Nesselroade, 2016). Cross-sectional designs are
especially common in studies of human cognitive development
because repeated retesting of the same individuals on a cognitive test
can lead to improvements in performance that are due to practice or
experience, not age-related change in abilities per se. In fact, most rel-
evant studies of spatial memory development in children have used
cross-sectional designs (Balcomb et al., 2011; Hermer-Vazquez et al.,
2001; Newcombe et al., 2006; Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1998;
Sluzenski et al., 2004), and these methods were adapted in the current
work to examine spatial memory development in chimpanzees and
bonobos.
This work took an experimental approach because disentangling
specific cognitive processes requires controlled experiments that can
rule out alternative explanations for observed patterns of results. As
any given behavior can be psychologically implemented by many dif-
ferent possible psychological mechanisms, observational research
alone is limited in terms of inferences about the cognitive mechanisms
causally underpinning behavior. As experimental research is extremely
challenging (or impossible) to carry out with wild populations
(Zuberbühler, 2014), studies in captivity are therefore often necessary
to appropriately rule out alternative psychological explanations (see
Tomasello & Call, 2008). The current studies examined cognition in
two populations of apes living in African sanctuaries, where apes
semi-free-range in large, naturalistic rainforest enclosures within com-
plex social groups, but controlled experiments are also possible. Apes
in these sanctuaries are typically born in the wild, and enter the sanc-
tuary after being confiscated at an early age as a result of the trade in
wildlife for pets and bushmeat. Individuals are cared for by a surrogate
human parent and then rapidly integrated into a peer group (Cox
et al., 2000), an approach that has been shown to produce the most
optimal psychological outcomes in direct comparisons of different ape
rearing practices (van IJzendoorn, Bard, Bakersmans-Kranenburg, &
Ivan, 2008). Indeed, African sanctuaries meet or exceed recommended
standards for high-quality physical and social environments for captive
apes derived from these species' wild conditions (Pruetz & McGrew,
2001). Moreover, empirical observations of the sanctuary populations
tested here show that apes at both sites are psychologically healthy
relative to other captive populations, and rarely or never show aber-
rant behaviors seen in zoo or laboratory populations (Rosati et al.,
2013; Wobber & Hare, 2011). Direct comparisons of orphaned apes
with age-matched mother-reared individuals show no major differ-
ence in cognition across multiple social and physical cognitive tasks
(Wobber et al., 2014); orphans and mother-reared apes also exhibit
similar cortisol profiles (Wobber & Hare, 2011). Overall, this indicates
that the orphaned apes in these populations exhibit typical patterns
of cognitive and physiological development. Importantly, sanctuary
sites can also better equate the environments that these different
species experience over their individual lifetimes. For example, wild
chimpanzees and bonobos might acquire different cognitive skills in
direct response to their individual experiences in different habitats.
While sanctuary apes semi-free-range, they receive the majority of
their food through provisioning, and experience relatively standard-
ized rearing procedures across these sites (Farmer, 2002). Thus,
experimental comparisons of psychology in these populations can
provide new insights into the evolution of cognitive traits.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Ethics statement
All behavioral studies were approved by Duke University (IACUC
#A078-08-03) and adhered to host country legal requirements in
Congo Republic (Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological
Innovation, permit 009/MRS/DGRST/DMAST), and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (Ministry of Research and the Ministry of Environ-
ment, permit MIN.RS/SG/004/2009).
2.2 | Subjects and study sites
These studies examined chimpanzees living at Tchimpounga Chimpan-
zee Sanctuary in Pointe Noire, Congo Republic; and bonobos living at
Lola ya Bonobo Sanctuary in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo.
Both sanctuaries are accredited members of the Pan-African Sanctu-
ary Alliance (PASA), and animal care practices at both sites complied
with PASA standards. Apes at both sites are socially housed, and the
majority are semi-free-ranging in large tracts of tropical forest during
the day (5–40 ha across groups). In the evening, all apes spend the
night in indoor dormitories (12–160 m2). Apes had ad libitum access
to water and were never food deprived for testing. In addition to the
food the apes could eat in their forest enclosures, they were provi-
sioned with a variety of fruits, vegetables, and other species-
appropriate foods two to four times daily. Data were collected in
2011 by the author and a research assistant, with additional assis-
tance from on-site animal caretakers.
Apes completed the studies depending on their access to appropri-
ate testing locations and willingness to participate (see Supporting
Information, Table S1 for subject details). Study 1 included 73 apes:
45 chimpanzees (21 females and 24 males, ranging from 3 to 20 years),
and 28 bonobos (11 females and 17 males, 3 to 13 years). This study
was conducted inside the apes' night dormitories; as such, all individuals
who had access to an indoor dormitory room of the appropriate config-
uration for the study and were willing to participate were tested,
including all individuals in the sanctuary under 10 years of age at the
time of the study. Two individuals stopped participating in their test
session during Study 1, and therefore only provided partial data for that
study (see Section 2.7). Study 2 included 73 apes: 41 chimpanzees
(18 females and 23 males, ranging from 2 to 10 years of age), and
32 bonobos (14 females and 18 males, ranging from 2.5 to 13 years).
Forty-three of these individuals also completed Study 1; 15 bonobos
and 28 chimpanzees participated in a previous memory study using a
similar setup more than a year earlier (Rosati & Hare, 2012), whereas
the rest were naïve. Study 2 was conducted in outdoor enclosures
adjacent to the night dormitories; all individuals who had access to
an appropriate enclosure and were willing to participate were tested,
again including all individuals under age 10 years. Finally, Study
3 was a motivational control where a subset of individuals from
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Study 2 were re-rested a version of the setup with reduced memory
demands. Thirty-two apes participated in Study 3:16 bonobos (rang-
ing from 2.5 to 12 years) and 16 chimpanzees (ranging from ages
3 to 8 years). Across these studies, no additional individuals were
selected for testing and then excluded due to lack of participation.
As exact birth dates for sanctuary apes born in the wild are gener-
ally unknown, individual's ages at these sites are estimated using initial
assessments by sanctuary veterinarians at arrival (typically when the
infants are between 1 and 3 years old), adjusted based on longitudinal
measurements of weight and dental emergence data from those indi-
viduals based on known patterns of ape development, and finally vali-
dated through checks of individuals born at the sites with known
exact birthdates (for more details on the age estimation method, see
Rosati & Hare, 2012; Wobber et al., 2014; Wobber et al., 2010b).
These age estimates have accorded well with results from teeth and
weight estimates alone in prior work examining cognitive and physio-
logical development in these populations (Wobber et al., 2010b;
Wobber et al., 2013).
2.3 | Procedure: Study 1 (long delay)
In Study 1, apes first experienced that one location (of two possible)
was baited with hidden food in an introductory session, and then then
their memory for that location was assessed in a test session 1 week
later (see Figure 1a for a diagram and Videos S1 and S2 for example
movies). Across both sessions, each ape was tested individually in an
indoor dormitory room (the same room for a given individual across
both sessions). The two experimenters stood outside the ape's room
and baited the locations or centered the subject though the mesh or
bars (see Figure 1a). The hiding locations were two overturned bowls
(24.5 cm diameter, 15 cm tall, and green in color) that were placed
2 m apart immediately outside the room. Food could therefore be hid-
den under them, and apes could easily approach and touch them to
indicate their choice. There were no additional cues to the correct
location; the room was otherwise identical to its typical setup as a
sleeping room. All containers were rubbed with fruit rewards prior to
the start of the task to ensure that apes used memory (rather than
olfactory cues) to locate the hidden reward.
Two experimenters ran the study. Experimenter 1 (E1) baited
(or fake-baited, as relevant) the two containers, and then moved away
and stood behind the centered camera, so as to not bias the ape toward
one side. During this time, Experimenter 2 (E2) centered the ape at the
starting position on the opposite side of the room, attracting the sub-
ject with a small piece of food. Once E1 had completed the baiting, E2
gave the ape the small piece of food at the centering position, and then
walked away so the ape would approach the containers on the other
side of the room (see Figure 1a). If the ape failed to approach either
cup within 2 min (a very rare occurrence), E1 then attracted them to
the center position between the containers with a small piece of food.
For younger apes, a familiar caretaker sat inside the room at the
starting position (to ensure that infants were comfortable participating)
but never provided any cues as to the food location. The subsequent
trial started after E2 attracted the subject back to the centered starting
position.
In the initial introductory session, apes learned which location was
consistently baited. First, apes completed two initial exposure trials
where E1 baited both containers with hidden food and placed an
additional visible food piece of food on top of both containers to
attract the apes. These trials introduced the testing setup, and
ensured that all apes were willing to touch the containers and had
experienced that the containers could contain hidden food. Apes had
to retrieve all the food in these trials before proceeding, demonstrat-
ing that they were comfortable and familiar with the basic setup
before proceeding to the main trials. Note that these trials did not
provide any additional information about the baited location. Apes
then completed 12 learning trials in which only one location was
baited with hidden food out of their sight, thus requiring that they
learn about its spatial location through trial-and-error across trials. In
particular, E1 baited and fake-baited both locations using the same
hand motions in counter-balanced order, to avoid providing any addi-
tional cues to the food's whereabouts. Once the ape approached or
touched one container, E1 would then reveal what was under the
container and give them the food if they were correct. If apes initially
approached the wrong location (e.g., because they did not know
which location was baited, especially early in the introductory
session), they could self-correct by approaching the alternative
location, (following methods from previous studies of animal mem-
ory; Packard, 1996; Rosati, Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014). Crucially, this
procedure ensured that all individuals had equivalent experience
with receiving food at the correct location before proceeding to
the test session. The side assignment of the baited location was
counterbalanced across individuals.
One week later, apes completed a test session with 10 test trials
(following the methods in Rosati, Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014). These
trials were identical to learning trials and occurred in the same room
with the same side baited, except that apes could not self-correct; this
lack of self-correction was implemented to limit additional opportuni-
ties to learn by trial-and-error within the test session. Here, E1 imme-
diately revealed the contents of the container once the ape indicated
their choice. If the ape was incorrect, E1 then immediately removed
the food from the correct location so the ape could not obtain it; note
that apes were present in the testing room continuously, including
when E1 removed the food following incorrect choices. The logic of
this design was that performance in the test session, as compared to
initial performance in the introductory session, could isolate the bene-
fit of the prior experience on memory recall above and beyond trial-
by-trial learning that could occur in both sessions.
2.4 | Procedure: Study 2 (multiple locations)
In Study 2, each ape was assessed for their ability to recall multiple
locations in a familiar outdoor enclosure after watching food being
hidden across this space (see Figure 1b for a diagram and Videos S3
and S4). Chimpanzees were tested individually in one of four enclo-
sures, and bonobos were tested in one of three, corresponding to the
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enclosure their social group's physical location. As the enclosures
were not completely identical in size across these different groups, food
was hidden in a space approximately 20 m × 20 m adjacent to the
ape's starting observation position, therefore equalizing the distances
individuals had to travel to acquire the food in the enclosure. All food
was hidden directly next to landmarks, including natural items (such as
trees, rocks, bushes, or grass patches), as well as artificial items (such as
fence posts, water spouts, pools, and climbing structures). For each
enclosure, there were two sets of locations that were approximately
matched in landmark type and distance to the ape's starting position.
To ensure that certain locations were not intrinsically attractive to the
apes, the assignment of those two sets as test or control locations was
counterbalanced across subjects tested in the same enclosure.
In the demonstration phase, the ape watched an experimenter hide
four test pieces of food next to various landmarks in the enclosure. Older
apes observed from a building or tunnel that they used to access the
enclosure, whereas younger apes were held by a familiar human care-
taker in the same approximate location. The experimenter first stood
approximately 0.5 m away from the ape, showed them a red bowl full of
a highly preferred food (large apple slices for bonobos; large banana
pieces for chimpanzees; the most preferred fruit in each population in
prior comparisons of food preferences; Rosati & Hare, 2013). The experi-
menter held up one piece of food in her hand and then walked in a direct
path to the hiding location while calling the ape's name and visibly waving
the food piece. Once the experimenter reached the hiding location, she
again called the ape's name until the ape oriented in her direction
(to ensure all apes paid attention to the baiting event), and then hid the
food while the ape was observing. The food was always hidden under
the grass, such that the food was not visible unless the ape actively
approached and searched in that location. The experimenter repeated
this procedure for all four test pieces; the order in which the experimenter
hid the food at different locations was randomized. An additional
four control pieces had been hidden in the enclosure prior to the
demonstration, while the ape was in a different location and could not
observe the enclosure. These pieces, therefore, accounted for any poten-
tial olfactory cues to the food's location as well as provided an index of
differences in motivation to generally search through the enclosure.
After a 10-min delay following the hiding of the last test piece, the
ape was released into the enclosure for the search phase to locate the
food. The search phase lasted 10 min, a period more than sufficient
for an ape to traverse the enclosure and consume the food. Entering
these enclosures alone or in small groups for brief periods of time is a
fairly standard occurrence at these sites, and all apes were familiar
with retrieving food inside the enclosures during normal sanctuary
provisioning procedures. Older apes entered the enclosure individu-
ally for the search phase. The youngest infants (who were still being
cared for in a nursery group by a human surrogate parent) entered the
enclosure with their human caretaker to ensure the infant was com-
fortable during the test. The caretaker sat in the middle of the enclo-
sure never provided any cues about the food's location. There were
not any behavioral signs that apes were uncomfortable when entering
the enclosure following these procedures.
Finally, as a check for food motivation, any apes that failed to find
any food in the search phase was given food in a motivation check imme-
diately after the search phase ended. Here, apes were directly given food
once the search phase had concluded in order to confirm that they were
in fact motivated to consume the food at that particular time, and check
that they were not failing to locate food due to satiation or dislike of the
food. In fact, all tested apes readily ate food in this context immediately
after the main test, suggesting they did like the food and were not sati-
ated at that particular point in time that they completed the study.
2.5 | Procedure: Study 3 (motivational control)
A subset of individuals who participated in Study 2 then completed a
follow-up study to further examine if apes were motivated to acquire
F IGURE 1 Setup for memory studies.
(a) In Study 1 (long delay), apes first learned
that one location was consistently baited
with food in initial learning trials, and then
were tested on their memory for that
location in test trials after a 1-week delay.
Experimenter 1 (E1) baited the locations,
and Experimenter 2 (E2) centered the ape
at the starting position on each trial. (b) In
Study 2 (multiple locations), apes observed
an experimenter hide four test pieces of
food in a large enclosure; four control
pieces were hidden at matched locations.
Apes could then search in the enclosure
following a 10-min delay. Study
3 (motivational control) had a similar setup,
but the food pieces were placed directly on
the ground, thus removing the memory
demands associated with the task while
still requiring motivation to search for
the food
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food in the same context in the absence of memory demands. In this
study, individuals who found two or fewer total pieces in Study 2 com-
pleted a second search test that was identical to Study 2, except that
apes did not need to recall specific locations in space. Highly success-
ful individuals from Study 2 were not tested in the control session as
they had already demonstrated that they were motivated to search in
the enclosure. The procedure for the control session was largely iden-
tical to that in Study 2, except in two respects. First, the four food
items were visibly placed next to landmarks in the enclosure during
the demonstration phase, rather than hidden in the grass, to remove
any memory demands associated with locating the food. Second, the
ape could enter the enclosure without a delay immediately after the
experimenter completed the demonstration, to further reduce any
memory demands associated with the time delay. As in the main study,
the apes had 10 min to traverse the enclosure to locate the food. For
each individual, the four baited locations comprised two from the previ-
ous test set and two from the previous control set, to equalize ape's
experience with the various locations (as some of these individuals had
located control pieces in the main test). Apes completed Study 3 a few
days after Study 2. Crucially, this study required that apes traverse the
enclosure and pick up widely distributed food pieces in the same way
as in Study 2, as the baited locations were not immediately visible from
the apes' initial observation point in this large space.
2.6 | Video coding and reliability
All experimental sessions were videotaped. In Study 1, the room was
filmed with a single camera centered outside the testing room, on E1's
side (see Figure 1a). Apes' choices to approach the different locations
were coded live by E1, and a coder blind to the correct side then
coded 20% of sessions for reliability; agreement was 100%. In Studies
2 and 3, sessions were videotaped from two camera angles: a static
wide angle shot of the entire enclosure that captured how apes trav-
eled through the space, and a second hand-held camera that was
zoomed in on the apes' actions (e.g., to better see if they were actually
searching in the grass and picking up food at different locations). The
experimenter narrated locations the ape searched, and then afterward
physically checked all eight hiding locations to confirm which pieces
had been retrieved. The experimenter then coded (from the videos)
the order in which pieces were found and the latency to find each
piece. A reliability coder, who was blind to the specific test and con-
trol locations in the enclosure, coded 20% of all sessions for when the
ape located food items; this reliability coding was done without sound
as the primary experimenter had narrated the apes' searches live. The
coder had high reliability for whether pieces of food were found
(Cohen's Kappa = 0.96 with agreement on 141 of 144 possible
pieces), as well as latency to find those pieces: Pearson's (r = .99).
2.7 | Data analysis
Data for these studies were analyzed using statistical models
implemented in R v3.5.0 (R Development Core Team, 2018). Trial-
by-trial responses coded as a binary outcome were analyzed using
generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) implemented with the glmer
function from the lme4 software package (Bates, 2010). These models
used a binomial (logit link) function, with random subject intercepts to
account for repeated trials within subjects. Linear mixed models were
implemented using the lmer function from the lme4 package; these
models were fitted with restricted maximum likelihood for parameter
estimation, and refit using maximum likelihood for model comparisons
(Zuur, Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, & Smith, 2009). Parameter significance of
these models was calculated using the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova,
Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015). Finally, linear regressions were
implemented with the lm function in the lme4 package. Across analyses,
the fit of different models were compared using likelihood ratio tests
(LRT: Bolker et al., 2008). Post hoc pairwise comparisons were
implemented with the emmeans function in the emmeans package
(Lenth, 2018) using a Tukey correction. Comparisons of age effects
across species (e.g., comparisons of the slope of trend lines for age)
were conducted using the emtrends function in the emmeans package.
Finally, graphs showing predicted effects and 95% confidence intervals
(CIs) from these models were calculated using the effects package in R
(Fox, 2003). Reported parameter estimates are unstandardized.
While several analyses used age in years as a linear predictor,
some analyses split apes into two age cohorts in order to examine
interactions between species and age group. In particular, apes were
split into infants up to 5 years, and older apes over 5 years (juveniles
and adults). This split is based on patterns of life history in these spe-
cies, and has been used in studies of growth patterns (Hamada,
Udono, Teramoto, & Sugawara, 1996) as well as wild behavior (Bray
et al., 2018) in Pan; prior work examining ape memory development
has also used this cutoff for infancy (Rosati & Hare, 2012).
In Study 1, four individuals (two per species) did not complete the
entire test session: two individuals stopped participating of their own
accord (one per species), and the experimenter made a baiting error
(e.g., baiting the wrong side) for two others. These individuals' intro-
ductory and partial test session data (up to when they stopped partici-
pating or experienced the error) was included in analyses when
possible, as GLMMs can account for unequal repeats across subjects
(Baayen, 2008). However, these subjects could not be included in ana-
lyses examining difference scores (mean improvement across whole
sessions) or comparisons of average overall session performance, so
those analyses had a sample size of 69 apes. No other individuals
were tested and excluded from these studies. In Study 2, to control
for any potential differences in speed of search and eating across indi-
viduals, the analyses reported here focused on the first four pieces
that apes located (following the approach used in Rosati & Hare,
2012). The logic of this is that an individual with perfect memory
should first search at the four test locations, even if they then contin-
ued to search elsewhere in the enclosure for any time left in the
session.
2.8 | Data availability
All data from these studies are available at Dryad Digital Repository:
https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.987md65.
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3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Memory after a long delay (Study 1)
Study 1 examined developmental changes in apes' memory for a loca-
tion over a 1-week delay. The first set of analyses confirmed that both
species did successfully learn the baited location over the course of
the introductory session. On their first learning trial, before any experi-
ence with the reward location, apes did not show a preference for the
baited location: only 53.6% of bonobos (binomial test: 15 of 28 cor-
rect, p > .85, n.s.) and 44.4% of chimpanzees (20 of 45 correct;
p > .55, n.s.) chose correctly on their first trial. This confirms that in
the absence of experience with the baited location, the apes showed
chance level choices for the baited location and could not directly
detect the food's location through some other means, such as by
using olfactory cues. Over the course of the learning trials in the initial
introductory session, both species learned to choose the correct loca-
tion. Over all learning trials, bonobos chose the correct location on
M = 61.9 ± SE = 5.1% of learning trials (one-sample t test: t27 = 2.34,
p < .05), and chimpanzees did so on 60.9 ± 4.2% of learning trials
(t44 = 2.62, p < .05). Indeed, by their final (12th) learning trial, 78.6%
of bonobos (binomial test: 22 of 28 correct, p < .005), and 66.7% of
chimpanzees (binomial test: 30 of 45 correct, p < .05) approached the
baited location, a significant preference in both species. Thus, both
species could successfully learn through trial-and-error which location
was rewarded over the course of the introductory session.
The second set of analyses then examined whether apes had more
accurate performance in the test session relative to the introductory
session, the main test of whether spatial information was recalled over
the 1-week delay (see Figure 2a). Neither species chose the baited loca-
tion above chance on their first test trial (bonobos: 57.1% [16 of 28]
were correct, p > .57, n.s.; chimpanzees: 51.1% [23 of 45] were correct;
p > .51, n.s.), the strongest test of their long-term memory for the
baited location. Importantly, trial-by-trial learning could occur in both
sessions, so a comparison of overall performance in these sessions can
also isolate the memory benefit of the initial experience above and
beyond such learning, while also accounting for any individual variation
in general performance. Such “savings in relearning” are generally taken
as evidence for memory traces, for example, in developmental studies
of children's memory (Bauer, 2005; Bauer, 2006; Bauer, Wiebe, Carver,
Waters, & Nelson, 2003). While such memory traces might be weaker
than those supporting recall on the first test trial, differences in rate of
relearning can provide additional evidence into differences in memory
storage across species and age cohort.
In fact, species and age cohorts differed in their degree of relative
improvement in the test session. Infant chimpanzees, older chimpan-
zees, and infant bonobos all showed more accurate performance in
their test session compared to their initial learning session perfor-
mance (infant chimpanzees: 76.2 ± 7.4% correct in test session, 15.9%
improvement compared to learning session; paired-samples t test:
t12 = 2.91, p < .05; older chimpanzees: 78.7 ± 4.5% correct in test ses-
sion, 16.2% improvement compared to learning session; t29 = 3.47,
p < .005; infant bonobos: 82.9% ± 9.2% correct in test session, 30.5%
improvement compared to learning session; t6 = 3.32, p < .05). However,
older bonobos did not show improvement (67.4 ± 6.4% correct in test
session, 2.8% improvement compared to learning session; t18 = 0.53,
p > .60, n.s.). This indicates that while younger bonobos and chimpanzees
of all ages showed a memory benefit in the test session after the delay,
older bonobos showed identical patterns of performance in both ses-
sions, despite their additional experience when they completed the test
session.
To further probe this finding, GLMMs were used to examine
improvements in performance across sessions while accounting for
trial-by-trial changes in performance due to learning. Here, an initial
base model accounted for subject (as a random factor), trial number
(1–12), species, and age cohort (infants vs. older individuals) as predic-
tors. The inclusion of trial number specifically accounts for any within-
session improvements due to trial-by-trial learning. A second model
then added session (introductory vs. test) as an additional predictor to
test whether apes showed overall better performance in test trials com-
pared to initial leaning trials, reflecting a memory benefit in perfor-
mance. This improved model fit (LRT: χ2 = 58.08, df = 1, p < .0001),
indicating that apes were overall more accurate in the test session.
Finally, a third model then added a three-way interaction between spe-
cies, cohort, and session to test the key hypothesis that species exhibited
different developmental patterns in the strength of this memory bene-
fit. In fact, this interaction further improved model fit (LRT: χ2 = 13.78,
df = 4, p < .01; see Table 1 for parameters from the full model). Post
hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that infant chimpanzees, older
chimpanzees, and infant bonobos all improved in their test session
compared to the introductory session (p < .01 for significant pairwise
comparisons), aligning with results reported above. That is, younger
bonobos and chimpanzees of all ages showed a memory benefit from
their initial experience, when they were tested again 1 week later.
However, older bonobos did not show a significant improvement
between the introductory session and test session (p > .88, n.s.),
indicating that they exhibited similar performance across both sessions.
This trial-by-trial analysis therefore also supports the conclusion that
chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit developmental differences. Addi-
tional checks showed that curtailing the chimpanzee age range to
match bonobos, as well as removing two outlier chimpanzees, produced
the same basic results (see Supporting Information for these details).
To further isolate the benefit provided by the initial learning expe-
rience for the apes' subsequent memory in the test session, each indi-
vidual was then assigned a difference score indexing their relative
improvement in the test session after the 1-week delay (percent cor-
rect in test session minus percent correct in introductory session; see
Figure 2b), the same approach as prior work using this task with
lemurs (Rosati, Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014). This difference score, there-
fore, captures the relative improvement in test trials compared to that
individual's performance in initial learning trials. Here, an initial linear
regression model accounted for age (as a continuous predictor) and
species; an age by species interaction was then added in a second
model to test whether apes exhibited any developmental differences
in their relative improvement. In fact, this improved model fit (LRT:
χ2 = 4.18, df = 1, p < .05). Post hoc comparisons of the two species'
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age effects revealed that bonobos' difference score declined with age,
significantly different from the pattern seen in chimpanzees (p < .05).
Indeed, difference scores were negatively correlated with age in
bonobos (rp = −.39, p < .05), but showed no relationship with age in
chimpanzees (rp = .01, p > .94, n.s.). This age-related change in the
difference score provides additional evidence that chimpanzees and
bonobos differed in their spatial memory trajectories. The same addi-
tional checks on subsets of the data (described above) also produced
the same basic results for the difference score analysis (see Supporting
Information).
The final set of analyses then examined trial-by-trial learning rates
across the species and age cohorts (see Figure 3). This analysis exam-
ined whether some animals learned the baited location faster in the
test session compared to the learning session, by directly comparing
their learning rates across the two sessions. To do this, an initial base
model for each species accounted for subject (as a random factor), trial
number (within a session), session (learning or test), and age cohort as
predictors. A second model then added the interaction between trial
number and session to test whether trial-by-trial learning rates differed
across the two sessions. The full model finally included a three-way
interaction between trial number, session, and cohort to examine
whether the younger and older apes differed in their respective learn-
ing patterns. For chimpanzees, this analysis revealed that both trial
number (estimate = 0.161, SE = 0.054, z = 2.972, p < .005) and session
(estimate = 0.155, SE = 0.618, z = 2.508, p < .05) were significant
predictors in the full model, whereas cohort was not (estimate = 0.576,
SE = 0.636, z = 0.906, p > .36, n.s.). Importantly, the inclusion of the
trial number X session interaction term did not improve model fit com-
pared to the base model (LRT: χ2 = 2.21, df = 1, p > .13, n.s.), indicat-
ing that chimpanzees exhibited the same learning-based rates of
improvement across both sessions. Including the cohort X trial number
X session interaction (LRT: χ2 = 6.45, df = 4, p > .16, n.s.), also did not
improve fit, aligning with the prior results that younger and older
chimpanzees showed similar patterns of performance. Together, this
indicates that chimpanzees in both age cohorts show similar learning
rates across both sessions, but were overall better in the test
session—with no age-related differences in performance.
Bonobos showed a different pattern of learning compared to chim-
panzees. In the full model, trial number (estimate = 0.343, SE = 0.083,
z = 4.144, p < .0001), session type (estimate = 2.860, SE = 0.898,
z = 3.186, p < .005), and cohort (estimate = 1.704, SE = 0.822, z = 2.073,
p < .05) were significant predictors. As in chimpanzees, the inclusion of
the trial number X session interaction terms did not improve model fit
(LRT: χ2 = 0.37, df = 1, p > .54, n.s.), indicating similar rates of trial-by-
trial learning across both sessions for bonobos. However, the inclusion
F IGURE 2 Memory after a long delay (Study 1). (a) Mean performance in the learning session and test session 1 week later; error bars
indicate SE. (b) Scatter plot of difference scores (indexing each individual's relative improvement between the introductory and test session),
plotted by age for each species (bonobo r2 = .15, chimpanzee r2 = .00)
TABLE 1 Factors influencing performance in the long delay task
(Study 1)
Factor Estimate SE z p
Trial number (1–12) 0.154 0.020 7.653 <.0001
Species (Bonobo reference) 0.078 0.645 0.120 >.90
Cohort (Infant reference) 0.384 0.609 0.631 >.52
Session (Learning reference) 1.823 0.431 4.235 <.0001
Species X cohort −0.201 0.770 −0.261 >.79
Species X session −0.700 0.525 −1.332 >.18
Cohort X session −1.509 0.490 −3.082 <.005
Species X cohort X session 1.619 0.612 2.647 <.01
Predictors from the full (best-fit) generalized linear mixed model examining
trial-by-trial binary responses (correct or incorrect) in Study 1. All models
included trial number, species, age cohort, and subject (as a random factor);
session (learning vs. test) and the species X cohort X session interaction
were then added to successive models to test their importance as
predictors. Reference values for predictors are indicated in the table and
significant predictors are bolded.
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of the three-way interaction between trial number, session, and cohort
did improve model fit for bonobos (LRT: χ2 = 16.09, df = 4, p < .005);
post hoc tests further revealed that infants showed more accurate per-
formance in the test session compared to control session (p < .001),
whereas older bonobos did not (p > .61, n.s.). That is, bonobos
exhibited within-session learning effects much like chimpanzees did,
but only younger bonobos exhibited overall better performance in the
test session. Older bonobos, in contrast, learned about the location of
the reward across trials within each session, but showed no relative
gain in performance when they were tested after the week-long delay
(see also Supporting Information Figure S1).
Overall, these results show that chimpanzees and bonobos
exhibited different patterns of development in this delayed recall con-
text. First, chimpanzees showed a similar memory benefit in their test
session regardless of their age: both younger and older chimpanzees
improved in the test session compared to the introductory session,
and there was no relationship between their difference score indexing
their improvement and an individual's age. This “savings in relearning”
(Bauer, 2005; Bauer, 2006; Bauer et al., 2003) suggests that chimpan-
zees did retain a memory trace of their experiences in the introductory
session, albeit on that may have been weak. Bonobos, however,
showed a different developmental pattern. Younger bonobos improved
in the test session compared to their initial experience 1 week before,
more like chimpanzees. In contrast, older bonobos did not exhibit any
memory benefits or savings in relearning. Finally, the analysis of learn-
ing rates showed similar patterns of trial-by-trial learning within ses-
sions across these groups. The main difference rather seems to be that
younger bonobos and chimpanzees of all ages had an overall boost in
memory performance in the test session, whereas older bonobos effec-
tively re-learned the baited location over the same time-course in their
test session as they previously had in their initial learning trials. Notably,
neither species selected the baited location above chance on their first
test trial, unlike some species of lemurs tested on a similar task (Rosati,
Rodriguez, & Hare, 2014). This may be due in part to the fact that the
current study provided only minimal cues (e.g., presence of the colored
hiding containers) signaling that apes were in this particular test rather
than a normal feeding situation inside their night dormitory. This con-
trasts with the lemur work, where animals searched on a novel maze
apparatus that was introduced to the room only during the task.
3.2 | Memory for multiple locations (Study 2)
Study 2 examined developmental changes in apes' memory for multiple
locations in a larger space. Overall, apes found M = 1.08 ± SE = 0.15
test pieces, but only 0.16 ± 0.05 control pieces, a significant difference
(t72 = 6.48, p < .0001). This indicates that apes did utilize spatial mem-
ory to retrieve food when searching in the enclosure, as they found
more test pieces (that they had previously seen hidden) than control
pieces (which they had not). However, there were also important differ-
ences in performance across age cohorts and species. For example,
whereas infant chimpanzees found an average of 0.57 ± 0.18 test
pieces (modal number of zero test pieces), older chimpanzees found an
average of 2.05 ± 0.34 test pieces (with a model number of 3 pieces
out of four possible located; see Figure 4a for complete breakdown).
The first analysis of this task therefore compared the abilities of chim-
panzees and bonobos of different ages to locate test versus control
pieces. Linear mixed models were implemented to analyze the number
of test versus control pieces that each subject located during
the search phase. Here, an initial base included subject (as a random
factor accounting for repeated measurements), species, and age cohort.
F IGURE 3 Learning about rewarded locations across trials (Study 1). Estimated values for correct responses, split by session (initial learning
trials vs. test trials after 1-week delay) and age cohort (infants vs. older) for both species. Estimates are derived from linear mixed models
accounting for trial number, session, and age cohort. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for estimates
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A second model then added location type (test vs. control location),
which improved model fit (χ2 = 34.12, df = 1, p < .0001). This confirms
that apes found more test than control pieces of food overall, even
when accounting for variation across ages and species. The full model
then added the interaction between species, cohort, and location, the
main test of the hypothesis that chimpanzees and bonobos differed in
the development of their spatial memory abilities. Including this interac-
tion further improved model fit (χ2 = 27.20, df = 4, p < .0001), and
post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that older chimpanzees found
more test pieces than control pieces, as well as more test pieces than
any other group found either test or control pieces (p < .05 for all sig-
nificant comparisons). This analysis further indicated that location type
(test vs. control) and the three-way interaction between species, cohort,
and location were only significant predictors in the full model (see
Table 2 for all parameters). This indicates that apes used spatial mem-
ory to guide their searches in the enclosure, but also that chimpanzees
exhibited great improvements in spatial memory with age than bono-
bos. This result aligns with prior work showing the same basic pattern
using a modified version of the same task (Rosati & Hare, 2012).
A more detailed look at the two species' search patterns further
suggests that individuals across both species could successfully recall
at least one location, differing primarily in their ability to recall multi-
ple locations. In particular, of the apes that located at least one piece
of food, both species first approached a test location above chance
(binomial tests: n = 21 of 23 chimpanzees found a test piece first,
p < .0001; n = 15 of 16 bonobos found a test piece first, p < .001).
That is, both chimpanzees and bonobos used their memory to selec-
tively search at a test location when they first entered the enclosure.
However, differences emerged in their search patterns for subsequent
searches. Chimpanzees continued to preferentially locate test pieces
on their second search (15 of 16 who found a second piece of food;
p < .001), and third search (12 of 15; p < .05). It was only on their final
search that chimpanzees did not show a statistical preference for test
locations (5 of 9 found a test piece; p > .99, n.s.). In contrast, fewer
individual bonobos located additional pieces at all: they showed a
trend to target test pieces on their second search (7 of 8; p = .07), but
only three individuals located a third piece of food (all test pieces),
and only one bonobo located a fourth piece (also a test piece). Thus,
while both species located an initial test piece above chance, only
chimpanzees sustained this pattern in their subsequent searches.
Comparisons of the two species' search latencies further show that
these results could not be explained by differences in the speed at
which apes traveled through the enclosure, for example, because bono-
bos searched more slowly than chimpanzees. In fact, there was no dif-
ference in how quickly apes located the first test piece: chimpanzees
took an average of 50.0 ± 20.6 s, whereas bonobos took an average of
36.9 ± 13.1 s (t36 = −0.47, p > .63, n.s.). To examine latencies across
all test pieces that apes located, a linear base model was fit including
random subject intercepts, the order the test piece was found (search
1 through 4), age (as a linear predictor), and species. This revealed that
only order was a significant predictor of latency (estimate = 60.04,
SE = 9.53, t = 6.40, p < .001). A second model then included the inter-
action between species and order to check if bonobos simply
approached test locations more slowly than chimpanzees. In fact, this
interaction did not improve model fit (χ2 = 0.56, df = 1, p > .45, n.s.).
This indicates that when bonobos and chimpanzees located a test
piece, they found it in a similar timeframe, suggesting they did not dif-
fer in the speed at which moved through the enclosure or ate the food.
The final analysis focused on the spatial specificity of the two spe-
cies' search patterns. To do so, a difference score was calculated for
each individual (test pieces minus control pieces found; see Figure 4b).
An ape who entered the enclosure and located many test pieces as well
control pieces—that is, who found many pieces of food but did not
exhibit targeted searches for test pieces—was therefore assigned a low
F IGURE 4 Memory for multiple locations (Study 2). (a) Mean number of test and control pieces found across species and age cohorts; error
bars indicate SE. (b) Scatter plot of difference score (indexing each individual's spatial specificity of searches), plotted by age for each species
(bonobos: r2 = .08; chimpanzees: r2 = .28)
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difference score, similar to an individual who found nothing at all. To
compare developmental trajectories across species, an initial linear
model included age (as a continuous predictor) and species as predictors
for the difference score. A second model then added the interaction
between age and species, which improved model fit (χ2 = 15.64, df = 1,
p < .0001); post hoc comparisons of the two species' age effects rev-
ealed that the two species differed in their age trajectories, with chim-
panzees exhibiting a more positive relationship than bonobos (p < .001).
Indeed, difference scores did not vary with age in bonobos (rp = −.28,
p > .11, n.s.), but significantly increased with age in chimpanzees
(rp = .53, p < .001). This shows that chimpanzees exhibited improve-
ments in the spatial specificity of their searches with age, whereas
bonobos did not exhibit developmental change.
Together, these results indicate that chimpanzees exhibited more
accurate memory for multiple locations than bonobos, and this differ-
ence increased with age. Infants of both species exhibit similar perfor-
mance, typically finding only one hidden test piece. While older
chimpanzees showed significant improvements in their ability to recall
the location of multiple test pieces in a large space, older bonobos did
not exhibit age-related improvement compared to younger bonobos.
This replicates the basic results from prior work showing that chimpan-
zees exhibited age-related changes in spatial memory in a slightly differ-
ent version of the current task (the prior work involved more hiding
locations and a longer delay before apes could search), whereas bono-
bos did not (Rosati & Hare, 2012). The current study further tested a
larger sample of bonobos and still found no evidence for developmental
change in their memory for multiple locations.
3.3 | Motivational control (Study 3)
Finally, Study 3 examined whether performance in Study 2 may have
stemmed from motivational constraints, as opposed to memory
demands associated with recalling multiple locations in the enclosure.
One possibility is that older chimpanzees were increasingly motivated
to eat or search for food, which could account for the changes in their
performance compared to bonobos. Evidence from Study 2 does not
support this alterative interpretation, as the post-test motivational
check showed that all individuals would readily eat food they were
directly given immediately after their participation in Study 2. Similarly,
apes' latencies to acquire food further suggest that chimpanzees and
bonobos approached locations at a similar speed when they did locate
test pieces, suggesting similar motivation to acquire food. However,
Study 3 provides a more definitive test of motivational differences
across chimpanzees and bonobos.
To address whether individuals who did not acquire many test
pieces in Study 2 were more successful at acquiring food when the
memory demands of the task were removed, the number of food
pieces they acquired in Study 3 (where food was placed visibly on the
ground) was compared to their performance in Study 2 (see Figure 5).
This subset of chimpanzees located an average of 0.44 ± 0.16 test
pieces in Study 2, but found 3.56 ± 0.20 pieces in the motivation con-
trol, a significant difference (t15 = 14.12, p < .0001). Similarly, this
subset of bonobos found 0.75 ± 0.20 pieces in Study 2, but
3.37 ± 0.30 in the motivation control (t15 = 8.72, p < .0001). The
modal number of test pieces found in Study 2 across these sample of
individuals was zero, whereas the mode was four (the maximum possi-
ble amount) in the motivational control. Thus, these individuals were
much more successful at acquiring food in a context that was identical
to Study 2 in terms of the need for motivation to search in the enclo-
sure and eat the food, but removed the memory-specific demands.
This indicates that the different performance of chimpanzees and
bonobos in Study 2 was likely due to differences in spatial memory,
not a more general lack of motivation to or lack of willingness to travel
around the enclosure. In fact, this aligns with past work using a modi-
fied version of the control task. A prior study (Rosati & Hare, 2012)
tested the same populations of apes on slightly different control task,
where apes saw the test pieces hidden in the grass (as in Study 2) but
then could enter the enclosure to search immediately. As such, this
procedure reduced but did not entirely remove the memory demands
associated with locating food. In fact, individuals of both species
retrieved more test pieces in the control than when they had to wait
the full delay. The current results further show that both chimpanzees
and bonobos exhibit similar motivation to acquire food in this context
when memory demands are entirely removed, in a stronger test of
motivation constraints. Overall, this set of findings supports the con-
clusion that the differential performance of chimpanzees and bonobos
stems from differences in their recall of multiple locations, not their
motivation to search for food.
4 | DISCUSSION
The current results show that bonobos and chimpanzees differ in their
developmental patterns for two components of spatial memory. Study
1 found that infant chimpanzees, older chimpanzees, and infant bono-
bos were more accurate in a test session (after a 1-week delay) than
in an initial introductory session, without any age-related differences
in performance in chimpanzees. These “savings in relearning” (Bauer,
2005; Bauer, 2006; Bauer et al., 2003) indicate that their performance
TABLE 2 Factors influencing performance in the multiple
locations task (Study 2)
Factor Estimate SE t p
Species (Bonobo reference) 0.190 0.304 0.626 >.53
Cohort (Infant reference) 0.105 0.310 0.339 >.73
Location type (Control reference) 1.077 0.303 3.554 <.001
Species X cohort 0.004 0.411 0.010 >.99
Species X location type −0.696 0.386 −1.805 =.075
Cohort X location type −0.551 0.393 −1.400 >.16
Species X cohort X location type 1.920 0.521 3.686 <.001
Predictors from the full (best-fit) linear mixed model examining number of
test versus control pieces located in Study 2. All models included species,
age cohort, and subject (as a random factor); location (test vs. control) and a
species X cohort X location interaction were then added to successive
models to test their importance as predictors. Reference values for
predictors are indicated in the table and significant predictors are bolded.
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in the test session built upon a memory trace from their initial expe-
riences in the introductory session. In contrast, older bonobos did not
show this memory benefit: they learned about the location of the baited
location on a trial-by-trial basis in both sessions, but did not show a
memory benefit from the earlier experience in the test session. Study
2 further revealed differences in these species' developmental trajecto-
ries for recall of multiple locations. Here, chimpanzees exhibited robust
developmental improvements in spatial searching between infancy and
juvenility, much like humans (Balcomb et al., 2011; Sluzenski et al.,
2004)—and note that the current task involved more locations, longer
delays, and a much larger physical space than those child studies, and
therefore likely even imposed more difficult memory demands. Bonobos,
in contrast, did not show any change in the same age range, as in prior
work using this same basic task (Rosati & Hare, 2012). Finally, Study
3 ruled out that this difference in performance was due to motivation:
individuals of both species were here very successful at retrieving the
food when they did not need to recall any specific locations per se, but
did need motivation to travel through the enclosure and search for food.
These same individuals did not retrieve much food in the context of
Study 2 where memory was needed to acquire the food. Importantly,
chimpanzees and bonobos have similar rearing experiences in sanctuar-
ies, as these sites engage in similar standardized care practices as well as
extensive food provisioning such that neither species depends primarily
on individual foraging for food (Farmer, 2002; Wobber & Hare, 2011).
The similarities in the environments of both populations suggest that
these developmental differences are unlikely to have stemmed from dif-
ferent individual experiences with complex foraging problems. Rather,
these differences are more likely to reflect species-typical cognitive traits.
Overall, these findings support the conclusion that socioecology may
shape patterns of cognitive development in Pan, as even closely related
species with similar life history characteristics can exhibit different devel-
opmental trajectories for aspects of mature spatial competency.
Prior work examining bonobo morphology, physiology, and behav-
ior have supported the hypothesis that bonobos are paedomorphic
relative to chimpanzees, in that they retain more immature or
“juvenilized” traits later into development (Behringer et al., 2014;
Furuichi & Ihobe, 1994; Hohmann & Fruth, 1993; Kuroda, 1989;
Lieberman et al., 2007; Palagi, 2006; Shea, 1983a; Shea, 1983b; Shea,
1984; Wobber et al., 2010b; Wobber et al., 2013). The current work
similarly indicates that heterochrony, or evolutionary changes in the
developmental timing of events, may have played a role in shaping these
species' cognitive abilities (see also Rosati & Hare, 2012; Wobber et al.,
2010b). In particular, older bonobos exhibited developmental lags in
memory for multiple locations relative to chimpanzees, in line with wild
chimpanzees' greater dependence on patchily distributed food resources
and larger day ranges (Gruber & Clay, 2016; Hare et al., 2012; Kano,
1992; Malenky & Wrangham, 1993). It is important to note that some
proposals concerning paedomorphism in bonobos argue that the core
selective regime is for reduced aggression, whereas other traits that dif-
fer between bonobos and chimpanzees (such as morphology or cogni-
tion) are a “by-product” of this selection (Hare et al., 2012). However,
even this proposal suggests that selection on reduced aggression stems
from differences in dietary ecology, and consequent levels of scramble
competition, in these species. An important question for future work is
therefore whether changes in spatial memory could actually result from
selection on aggression—for example, because they are correlated traits
or share an underlying biochemical pathway, as is the case for other
potential examples of cognitive “by-products” (Hare et al., 2005; Hare
et al., 2012).
The current work also highlights some of the difficulties in exten-
ding biological concepts like heterochrony to cognitive traits. For
example, whereas chimpanzees did not exhibit major changes in their
ability to recall a single location over a long delay from infancy to
adulthood, older bonobos actually showed less improvements in spa-
tial recall than did younger bonobos or chimpanzee overall. Although
this does generally accord with the idea that bonobos exhibit relative
delays in their performance with age compared to chimpanzees, this
sort of apparent “decrease” in the trait in question is difficult to recon-
cile with typical applications of the concept of heterochrony, which is
grounded in morphological studies of body size and shape. For exam-
ple, previous support for the claim that bonobos paedomorphic comes
from studies showing that adult bonobos have a more juvenilized skull
than chimpanzees: the relationship between cranial shape and size
seen in chimpanzees is decoupled in bonobos, such that bonobos
exhibit a more juvenile shape even when they reach adult size
(Lieberman et al., 2007; Shea, 1983a; Shea, 1984; Shea, 1989). Along
these lines, most models of paedomorphism focus on differences
across species in the rate of developmental processes, differences in
the total duration of the developmental process, or differences in the
initial starting state of development (see Lieberman et al., 2007). Yet
while this heterochrony framework is useful for understanding the
emergence of evolutionary variation in cognition across species,
directly translating it into psychological terms is not necessarily
straightforward (Wobber et al., 2010a). For example, there is no clear
morphological parallel for the apparent decrease in a given “trait” with
age seen in bonobos' performance in Study 1: older bonobos actually
appear to show less of a memory benefit of the prior experience than
F IGURE 5 Motivation control (Study 3). A subset of individuals
who found few pieces in Study 2 were later tested in a subsequent
motivation control session where food was placed visibly on the
ground. Graph depicts mean test pieces found in Study 2 versus
motivation control session; error bars indicate SE
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do younger bonobos. Yet these kinds of plastic changes across the
lifespan, involving both age-related improvements and declines in
function, are actually quite common for cognitive traits. For example,
many facets of human cognition show declines across the lifespan
that parallel the changes seen in the current work. In particular,
human memory abilities exhibit relative increases during early devel-
opment and then decline during aging (Craik & Salthouse, 2008; Li
et al., 2004; Nyberg, Lovden, Riklund, Lindenberger, & Backan, 2012;
Ronnlund, Nyberb, & Backman, 2005). Similarly, other cognitive skills
such as motor inhibitory control show an inverted U-shaped trajectory
with age in apes: first increasing through juvenility and then declining
after adulthood (Manrique & Call, 2015). Thus, reconciling this charac-
teristic of cognitive traits—that they are more flexible and labile across
the entire lifespan than are morphological traits, and appear to both
“increase” and “decrease” at different points in time—is a key issue for
making heterochrony a tractable concept for cognition.
The current work also indicates that different components of spa-
tial memory can be ontogenetically decoupled in chimpanzees and
bonobos. In humans, the ability to recall a single location over time
and the ability to recall more than one location seem to both emerge
around the same time in toddlerhood (Sluzenski et al., 2004). How-
ever, in apes, these two components of spatial memory appear to
have different trajectories. For example, younger and older chimpan-
zees had similar abilities to recall a single location over a long delay,
whereas older chimpanzees outpaced younger chimpanzees in their
ability to recall multiple locations. This dissociation has important
implications for theories of cognitive evolution. As distinct mental sys-
tems can evolve independently across species, whereas functionally
linked systems tend to coevolve (Barton, 1996; Barton, 2006;
Striedter, 2005), it is important to determine whether different com-
petencies reflect distinct cognitive abilities, versus constituent parts
of a common cognitive representation. In fact, there is clear evidence
that multiple, functionally distinct systems can support memory
(Bird & Burgess, 2008; Burgess, 2008; Cohen & Squire, 1980; Corkin,
2002; Iaria, Petrides, Dagher, Pike, & Bohbot, 2003; Knowlton et al.,
1996; Poldrack et al., 2001; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire, 2004).
Even capacities that appear to share a common representation in
mature adults can sometimes be dissociated at earlier ages in human
development (Jabes & Nelson, 2015; Newcombe et al., 2006; Ribordy
et al., 2013), possibly because different regions of the hippocampus
mature on different timescales (Lavenex & Banta Lavenex, 2013;
Utsunomiya, Takano, Okazaki, & Mitsudome, 1999). The current work
with apes further shows that even capacities that appear to be linked
in human development can be dissociated in the ontogeny of other
species. Although human children exhibit concurrent developmental
change in memory for multiple locations in space and recall of a single
location over a longer delay (Balcomb et al., 2011; Ribordy et al.,
2013; Sluzenski et al., 2004), the current work showed that these are,
in principle, dissociable abilities in the development of other species.
This finding sets the stage for neurobiological comparisons of brain
development. While there have been few direct comparisons of chim-
panzee and bonobo neuroanatomy, there are some hints that they
exhibit variation in hippocampal structure. For example, subadult and
adult chimpanzees have a marginally larger, less asymmetrical
hippocampus than do age-matched bonobos (Hopkins, Lyn, &
Cantalupo, 2009), and chimpanzee hippocampus also has greater
connectivity with other brain regions, as measured through diffu-
sion tensor imaging (Rilling et al., 2011). One important question is
therefore how these differences in mature brain structure emerge
during ontogeny. Like humans, nonhuman apes experience extended
periods of postnatal brain development (Leigh, 2004; Sakai et al., 2011).
Thus, many of the same maturational changes in regions supporting
spatial cognition in humans may also be important in restructuring the
brains of nonhuman apes.
A final important question is whether life history and cognitive
development are uniquely linked in humans. The current work did not
support the conclusion that life history patterns necessarily covary
with patterns of cognitive development, as chimpanzees and bonobos
exhibit similar life history characteristics but divergent spatial memory
development. Other work suggests that even species with very differ-
ent life history patterns can sometimes exhibit similar patterns of cog-
nitive development, such as for social cognition (Rosati et al., 2016;
Tomasello et al., 2001). Yet it is important to note that many theoreti-
cal views linking life history and cognition in humans have focused on
skills such as tool use, hunting, or food processing more generally
(Gurven et al., 2006; Kaplan et al., 2000; Schuppli et al., 2012;
Schuppli et al., 2016). Thus, although spatial memory is an important
component of human foraging behavior, it may be that the life history
hypothesis is more relevant for other kinds of cognitive abilities. For
example, hunting and tool use involve multi-step sequences of behav-
ior, and also involve some level of cultural learning in humans. Thus,
an open question for future work is whether other these other skills
are more tightly linked to life history than is spatial memory. Another
possibility is that the life history hypothesis may uniquely apply to
hominins, rather than reflecting a more general evolutionary principle.
In some sense, human cognition and human life history are both such
outliers in the animal kingdom that they may require new explanatory
frameworks. However, even if this is the case, the life history hypoth-
esis still needs to be refined. The life history view generally posits that
humans exhibit slower cognitive development than other primates, in
line with our extended juvenile period (Bjorklund & Bering, 2003;
Bjorklund & Green, 1992; Kaplan et al., 2000). Yet recent direct com-
parisons of cognitive development in humans and apes have revealed
that humans may actually develop a given cognitive skill more quickly
than other primates (Herrmann, Call, Hernadez-Lloreda, Hare, &
Tomasello, 2007; Rosati, Wobber, et al., 2014; Wobber et al., 2014).
Thus, humans may indeed exhibit an exceptionally long developmental
period, but that does not necessarily mean that the pace of cognitive
development in our species is slower than in other animals with faster
life history profiles.
Overall, the current study has several implications for the evolu-
tion of human cognitive development. First, these results align with
emerging evidence for heterochrony in chimpanzee and bonobo
development: bonobos exhibit relative delays in spatial memory com-
pared to chimpanzees, much like the delays they exhibit in morpho-
logical, physiological, and behavioral development. Second, this work
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indicates that distinct systems may support memory for a single
location after a long delay and memory for multiple locations.
Although these skills appear unitary in human development, they
are in fact dissociable in nonhuman ape development. This high-
lights the critical importance of future comparisons of hippocampal
and brain development in general across chimpanzees, bonobos, and
humans—which can help tie cognitive change to underlying neurobio-
logical substrates. Finally, differences in the developmental trajectories
of chimpanzees and bonobos align with their wild socioecology, provid-
ing further evidence that these species do exhibit important differences
in their cognition and behavior. Overall, this indicates the importance of
integrating data from both species in order to understand human cogni-
tive evolution.
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